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“Hospital” Treatment Further Refined
Susan Thompson and Stuart Marchant1
R (on the application of CS) v Mental Health Review Tribunal; Managers of Homerton
Hospital (East London and the City Mental Health NHS Trust) (Interested Party)
Queen’s Bench Division, (Administrative Court), Pitchford J., 6 December 2004 
EWHC (Admin) 2958
The decision of a Mental Health Review Tribunal under section 72(1) Mental Health Act 1983 not to discharge
a patient on section 17 leave from hospital was not unlawful. The link between hospital and treatment may be
“gossamer thin” but still a “significant component” to justify renewal of detention
Introduction
CS was a patient liable to be detained on leave of absence from hospital (leave).2 She challenged the
decision of the Tribunal which had confirmed the lawfulness of her detention following renewal3
on the grounds that she was no longer receiving hospital treatment which justified continued
detention. The court, whilst restating that hospital treatment must be “a significant component” of
the treatment plan to be lawful under the Mental Health Act 1983 (the Act), found that, although
the Responsible Medical Officer’s (RMO) grasp on the patient was “gossamer thin”, it was a
“significant component” sufficient to justify continuing detention. As a patient liable to be
detained, CS could be recalled to hospital for treatment if she refused or failed to take her
medication in the community which introduced an element of compulsion that she accept
treatment in the community.
The Facts
CS, who had a clinical history of paranoid schizophrenia, and repeated admissions to hospital, was
detained in hospital for treatment in May 2003. Her detention was renewed on 29 October 2003.
On 5 November 2003 she applied for review of her detention to a Tribunal which confirmed that
she should remain liable to be detained at a hearing on 2 February 2004. She had in fact been on
leave since 5 November 2003. 
Her treatment in hospital comprised attending ward rounds at the hospital once every 4 weeks. These
were described by her RMO as an opportunity to discuss how leave was progressing, to discuss her
medication and how it was suiting her and to provide her with supportive and motivational work to
help her move from a hospital-based model of care to community-based care with the assertive
outreach team. The latter included support for compliance with medication as part of treatment.
1 Solicitors who acted for the interested party. Susan
Thompson is a partner at Beachcroft Wansbroughs.
Stuart Marchant is a solicitor at Bevan Brittan.
2 section 17 Mental Health Act (MHA) 1983
3 under section 20 MHA 1983
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Further leave was negotiated at each ward round. Additionally, CS had weekly sessions with the ward
psychologist. Her hospital-based care was also described by Counsel on behalf of the detaining
authority, as the continued provision of a place of refuge and stability, a reference point for CS in her
attempts to disengage with treatment in hospital and engage with treatment in the community. By the
time the court considered her case in December 2004, CS had been discharged from detention and
her care was continuing in the community without compulsion. 
The issue
...was CS’s mental illness of a nature or degree which made it appropriate for her to receive
treatment, a significant and justified component of which was treatment in a hospital?4
CS challenged the decision of the Tribunal that she should remain liable to detention and recall
(rather than directly challenging the detaining hospital following renewal), claiming its decision was
disproportionate and in breach of her human rights under Article 5 ECHR, her right to liberty, as
her treatment plan indicated that she was not receiving any hospital treatment. Broken down, she
argued that the Tribunal failed to properly exercise its powers by:
a) failing to order her immediate discharge, or
b) even if it accepted the need for further phasing of her discharge incorporating a continuing
element of liability to detention, by failing to name a day on which discharge should take effect, or 
c) failing to consider less restrictive (and more proportionate) options including the use of
guardianship under section 7 of the Act or supervised discharge pursuant to section 25 (A–J).
Joining in East London and the City Mental Health NHS trust as an interested party, CS initially
argued that the decision to renew her detention by her RMO was also unlawful because the RMO
was not seeking her actual admission to hospital, but in the course of the proceedings Counsel for
CS conceded that treatment in a hospital under section 3 can take place daily without overnight
stays in hospital.
The Law
(1) Section 17 leave
Section 17 provides the only lawful authority for a detained patient to be absent from the detaining
hospital.5 A person on leave remains liable to be detained and subject to consent to treatment
under Part IV of the Act. The RMO can “grant .....leave to be absent from the hospital subject to such
conditions (if any) as that officer considers necessary in the interests of the patient.”6 This can include a
condition that the patient lives in a particular place including a care home7 or that the patient
accepts medication or attends for medical treatment. Leave can be granted “indefinitely or on
specified occasions or for any specified period”8 and the period may be extended. Leave can be revoked
and the patient recalled to hospital by the RMO where “it appears to the RMO that it is necessary to
do so in the interests of the patient’s health or safety or for the protection of other persons.”9
4 Judgment at para 39
5 Jones, R. Mental Health Act Manual, 9th edition,
(Sweet & Maxwell, 2004) at para. 1–172
6 section 17(1) MHA 1983
7 See note under Conditions in Jones, R. 9th edition,
(Sweet & Maxwell, 2004) at para 1 – 176 
8 section 17(2) MHA 1983
9 section 17(4) MHA 1983
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(2) Duration of detention
A person cannot be recalled to hospital once he has ceased to be liable to be detained.10 It is
unlawful for a patient to be recalled to hospital to facilitate renewal of detention under section 20
of the Act.11 It will, however, be lawful if the treatment plan contains an element of hospital
treatment.12 This finding marked a departure from the position that had stood since Hallstrom13
that a patient on leave could not have his detention renewed. Developing this theme in R (on the
application of DR) v Mersey Care NHS Trust, the lawfulness of continued detention was held to
depend on
“. . . whether a significant component of the plan for the claimant was for treatment in hospital.
It is worth noting that, by section 145(1) of the Act, the words ‘medical treatment’ include
rehabilitation under medical supervision. There is no doubt, therefore, that the proposed leave
of absence for the claimant is properly regarded as part of her treatment plan. As para 20.1 of
the Code of Practice states, ‘leave of absence can be an important part of a patient’s treatment
plan’. Its purpose was to preserve the claimant’s links with the community; to reduce the stress
caused by hospital surroundings which she found particularly uncongenial; and to build a
platform of trust between her and the clinicians upon which dialogue might be constructed and
insight on her part into her illness engendered.”14
In setting boundaries to the limits of “hospital treatment” the discharge by an MHRT of detention
of a person on leave to a nursing home where it was acknowledged that hospital treatment would
arise at some point in the future, but its timing was uncertain, has been held to be lawful.15
(3) The Powers of the Tribunal 
Section 72(1) and (2) require the Tribunal to direct the discharge of a patient detained under
section 3 if it is not satisfied that
“he is then suffering from mental illness . . . of a nature or degree which makes it appropriate
for him to be liable to be detained in a hospital for medical treatment; or that it is necessary for
the health or safety of the patient . . . that he should receive such treatment16 having regard 
(a) to the likelihood of medical treatment alleviating or preventing a deterioration of the
patient’s condition; and (b) in the case of a patient suffering from mental illness . . . to the
likelihood of the patient, if discharged, being able to care for himself, to obtain the care he
needs or to guard himself against serious exploitation.”17
The Argument
The court was invited by Kristina Stern, Counsel representing both the MHRT and the Trust, to
consider CS’s treatment holistically, incorporating in-patient, out-patient and community
treatment, subject to constant assessment of each element. The significance of the element of
10 section 17(5) MHA 1983
11 R (on the application of W) v Hallstrom [1986] QB
1090, [1986] 2 All ER 306
12 section 20(4) MHA 1983; R v Barking Havering and
Brentwood Community Healthcare NHS Trust[1999] 1
FLR 106 
13 above, [1986] QB 1090, [1986] 2 All ER 306
14 [2002] EWHC 1810 at para 30
15 R (on the application of Epsom and St Helier NHS
Trust) v Mental Health Review Tribunal [2001]
EWHC 101(Admin)
16 Section 72(1) (i) and (ii) MHA 1983
17 Section 72(2) MHA 1983
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treatment received at hospital was directly related to CS’s response to the other elements and
liability to be detained should be maintained whilst hospital treatment remained a significant part. 
In response, it was argued by CS that what was happening was merely a method of enforcing 
co-operation with the outreach team. There was no in-patient treatment. Furthermore, the
Tribunal’s powers18, as Steven Simblet, Counsel, submitted on behalf of CS, represent “the reverse
side of the section 3 coin: in other words, if the Tribunal is not satisfied that the patient any longer satisfies
the conditions for detention under section 3, then the patient must be discharged.”19
The Decision
Pitchford J accepted that the test for continuing liability for detention was whether a significant
component of the plan was for the patient to receive medical treatment in a hospital.20 Finding the
contention on behalf of CS that what was happening was merely a method of enforcing 
co-operation with the Outreach Team to be too crude an analysis, Pitchford J supported the
difficult role of the RMO in managing a patient back into the community in a manner designed to
avoid the revolving door syndrome:
“Viewed as a whole the course of treatment should be seen..... as a continuing responsive
programme, during which the need for treatment in hospital and on leave was being constantly
reassessed depending upon the circumstances, including CS’s responses to AOT and the ward
round. Until such time as the transition was complete, the element of treatment at hospital
remained a significant part of the whole.21
It is clear to me that the RMO was engaged in a delicate balancing exercise by which she was,
with as light a touch as she could, encouraging progress to discharge. Her purpose was to break
the persistent historical cycle of admission, serious relapse and readmission. It may be that in
the closing stages of the treatment in hospital her grasp on the claimant was gossamer thin, but
to view that grasp as insignificant is, in my view, to misunderstand the evidence.”22
Each of the challenges against the Tribunal were dismissed. On failing to order her immediate
discharge, Pitchford J accepted the evidence of the RMO that :
“It is not appropriate to abruptly discharge a patient who has been subject to compulsory
admission and treatment as an in-patient for a number of months. I would strongly disagree
with an assertion that it is better for a patient to be discharged straight into the community
without adequate phasing of care and then re-sectioned if the patient suffers a relapse. Such a
statement shows little insight into modern means of engaging and treating patients with severe
mental illness... To allow CS’s section to lapse or bring it to an abrupt end only to re-section
her would greatly upset CS and damage the relationship between her and the clinical team. 
It would also mean that mental health services were only able to engage once CS has suffered a
significant deterioration...”23
18 under section 72(1) and (2) MHA 1983
19 Judgment at para 29
20 R(on the application of DR) v Mersey Care NHS Trust
[2002] EWHC 1810 at para 29; R (on the application
of CS) v MHRT [2004] EWHC 2958 at para 45
21 Judgment at para 44
22 Judgment at para 46. It should be noted that Pitchford J
ended this paragraph by stating that he was not
convinced by Ms Stern’s submission that “the mere
existence of the hospital and its capacity to be treated by
the patient as a refuge and stability is part of the
treatment of the patient at that hospital”
23 Judgment at para 46
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On failing to name a day on which discharge should take effect, Pitchford J again found in favour
of the medical evidence:
“That course could, as Miss Stern pointed out, have been disastrous. The RMO was not in a
position to know from one day to the next what CS’s prospects in the community could
ultimately be. Only upon the successful completion of the carefully laid plan of treatment
could discharge be risked”.24
Finally, on failing to consider less restrictive (and more proportionate) options, Pitchford J
accepted the medical evidence that CS’s personality would not be amenable to supervised
discharge as it was unlikely she would remain compliant with treatment. Whilst the Tribunal was
not asked to consider guardianship, Pitchford J was in no doubt that guardianship was not
appropriate. The new regime would have brought with it significant upheaval for CS, including a
whole new group of professionals. Arguably more relevant to practice, Pitchford J agreed with
Kristina Stern that “there was no power available under either regime to require the patient to take
medication”. He further commented that “CS’s knowledge of the RMO’s powers was a significant
element in her willingness to accept the treatment plan.”25
The Court found that the Tribunal members had also addressed the issue of proportionality
stating in their written decision that they had “taken into account R (on the application of H) v Mental
Health Review Tribunal North and East London Region [2001]26 and from the evidence are satisfied that
detention is a proportionate response having regard to the risks on discharge.”
On the issue whether a decision to continue detention under section 72 (1) required a proportionate
response under Article 5(1)(e) ECHR, Pitchford J applied the Court of Appeal’s judgment in
Nadarajah v Secretary of State for the Home Department27: A challenge to the proportionality of the
Tribunal’s exercise of its powers in CS’s case would not have been made out in any event:
“the question is whether or not domestic law permits the arbitrary detention of those in the
position of the claimant. It seems to me that manifestly it does not. Accordingly, there is no
dimension further to s 72 of the 1983 Act which needs to be added to the statutory right to
discharge and the exercise of the residual discretion. The application of the principle of
proportionality to this case leads in any event, in my view, to only one conclusion: the
interference with the claimant’s freedom of movement and choice were minimal in the context
of the object to be achieved, namely her satisfactory return to community care.28
Comment
(a) Section 17 leave
CS reaffirms that a patient on leave at the time of a tribunal decision not to discharge the patient
did not make the tribunal decision unlawful.29 The cases of DR and CS have liberalised what is
permissible where the patient no longer requires in-patient treatment but require an element of
compulsion to give effect to their treatment plan. A hospital bed may be unnecessary30 but the link
24 Judgment at para 49
25 Judgment at para 48
26 [2001] EWCA Civ 415
27 [2003] EWCA Civ 1768
28 Judgment at para 52
29 above, R (on the application of CS) v MHRT [2004]
EWHC 2958(Admin)
30 above, R (on the application of DR) v Mersey Care
NHS Trust [2002]EWHC 1810 (Admin)
196
Journal of Mental Health Law November 2005
between the treatment plan and hospital must be more than speculative.31 It must be a significant
component. The degree of custodianship or actual physical control over a patient’s movements as
part of a treatment plan may not be determinative.32 The decision in CS supports the position
promulgated in Barker that rehabilitation under medical supervision can include assessment or
monitoring of progress of a patient on leave.33 It can also include leave as part of a treatment
plan.34 The Code of Practice acknowledges that “leave of absence can be an important part of a
patient’s treatment plan.”35 As Lord Woolf MR in Barker commented “this appears to be just the type
of treatment contemplated by the second half of the definition of treatment contained in section 145 of the
Act.”36 Whilst adopting the test in DR, a more holistic view was taken by the court when
considering treatment and rehabilitation of CS, by reference to the continuing and responsive
programme. The emphasis or weight given to hospital treatment as a “significant component”37 of
treatment becomes more intangible when the whole of the programme is viewed in this way. How
is one element of an holistic plan more significant than another? It is no doubt true, as this case
shows, the exploration of the definitions of “hospital,” “medical treatment,” “in-patient” in the
context particularly of leave is evidence of the complexity of current law.38
A further conclusion to be drawn is that, whilst admission to hospital (and a bed) for treatment
surely remains a necessary pre-requisite to initial detention and application of the compulsory
treatment provisions of Part IV of the Act39, it is no longer necessary when judging the lawfulness
of renewal of detention. In this sense a different test is developing which requires only a
connection between hospital and treatment. That connection can be “gossamer thin” so long as it
can be shown to be a significant component of treatment. Logically, if different tests are being
applied on admission compared with renewal, can this be justified in the context of an individual’s
human rights? Have the courts gone too far in keeping pace with clinical practice and exposed an
inherent weaknesses in their decisions by discarding the requirement for in-patient treatment for
renewal of detention required in Hallstrom and Barker? Only time will tell.
(b) The future for guardianship and supervised discharge?
This question is posed in the context of the obiter views in CS40 and in DR.41 Both claimants failed
in their arguments that a less restrictive regime than remaining “liable to be detained” should have
been considered. In CS the RMO felt that her patient would not benefit from supervised discharge
because she would find it difficult to comply given her personality. The judge agreed.42
Guardianship was also dismissed. 
31 above, R(on the application of Epsom and St Helier
NHS Trust) v MHRT [2001] EWHC 101 (Admin)
32 Judgment at para 40
33 B v Barking, Havering and Brentwood Community
Healthcare NHS Trust [1999] 1 FLR 106 at 114
34 R (on the application of DR) v Mersey Care NHS Trust
[2002] EWHC 1810, para. 30 per Wilson J and
adopted in R(on the application of CS) v MHRT
[2004] EWHC 2958 at para. 39 
35 Mental Health Act Code of Practice revised 1999,
para. 20.1
36 above, B v Barking NHS Trust [ 1999] 1 FLR 106 at
112
37 above, B v Barking, Havering and Brentwood
Community Healthcare Trust [1999]; R (on the
application of DR) v Mersey Care NHS Trust [2002]
38 Hewitt, D. There is no magic in a bed – the renewal of
detention during a period of leave, Journal of Mental
Health Law July 2003, p 87 
39 See Jones R Mental Health Act Manual at para 1-042
9th Edition, (Sweet & Maxwell, 2004)
40 above, R (on the application of CS) v MHRT [2004]
EWHC 2958
41 R (on the application of DR) v Mersey Care NHS Trust
[2002] EWHC 1081 at para 32
42 ibid at para. 48
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Both powers fall short of permitting compulsory medical treatment in the community, unlike leave
which offers a more flexible, less structured framework for a person regardless of age. They can
assist in persuading the persuadable, but not the non-compliant, patient where the only available
sanctions are recall or admission to hospital. Whether the threat of compulsion offers an effective
carrot or stick will depend very much on the individual perceptions of what can be achieved by
patient and practitioner. Claims of their coercive effect and better outcomes without damage to the
therapeutic relationship are realised in some cases.43 Supervised discharge can work well for a
number of “difficult to engage” patients to ensure improved medication compliance44. Whilst
scrupulous about explaining that it does not permit a practitioner to force medication on a patient,
it binds patient and practitioner together “in a mutual obligation to work together with a frankly
articulated statement and care plan of the rationale based on objective risks and losses.”45
(c) Policy Context
The focus of the Mental Health Act 1983 is compulsory treatment in hospital. Overall, numbers
of admissions to hospital for mental illness have fallen46 but use of compulsion has increased in
the last 10 years by nearly 30%.47 The key community powers are supervised discharge,48
guardianship49 and leave50 (and, of course, for restricted patients, conditional discharge51). National
statistics are not collated of the number of patients granted leave from hospital. The Mental
Health Act Commission has suggested numbers in the region of 13,500 patients at any one time,52
a much greater uptake than for other powers.53
The NSF set out an ambitious programme.54 Its major components were the creation of assertive
outreach teams (AOTs)55 for “difficult to engage” people living in the community with the most
complex health and social needs, crisis resolution teams (CRTs)56 to work as an alternative to
hospital admission for individuals experiencing acute crisis in their mental health and early
intervention teams.57 The NHS Plan launched specific clinical initiatives aimed at making
community care work by introducing these teams.58 Described as the two most influential policy
documents in the lifetime of anyone currently working in mental health they signify
43 Bindman, Pinfold et al, National Evaluation of
Supervised Discharge and Guardianship, September 2001
44 Franklin, Pinfold et al, Consultant Psychiatrists’
Experiences of using Supervised Discharge. Psychiatric
Bulletin (2000) 24, 412–415
45 Mike Firn, Chair, National Forum for Assertive
Outreach, Evidence to the Joint Parliamentary Scrutiny
Committee on the Draft Mental Health Bill 2004.
46 DH: Hospital Activity Data, DH Publications, London 
47 Department of Health (2003) Statistical Bulletin
2003/22; DH: Korner Returns, DH Publications,
London
48 Mental Health Act 1983 section 25A-J inserted by the
Mental Health (Patients in the Community) Act 1995
49 Mental Health Act 1983 sections 7–10
50 Mental Health Act 1983 section 17
51 Mental Health Act 1983 sections 42(2), 73(2)
52 DMH (Memo) Submissions by the Mental Health Act
Commission to the Joint Parliamentary Scrutiny
Committee, November 2004
53 Department of Health(2004) Guardianship under the
Mental Health Act 1983,England,2004
54 Department of Health (1999) National Service
Framework for Mental Health: Modern Standards and
Service Models, London DH.
55 above, see also Department of Health, (2004)
2004/0457,National Service Framework for Mental
Health – Five Years On, p 20 reported of the 170 AOTs
envisaged by 2003 more than 263 teams were in place by
March 2004.
56 above, NSF for Mental Health – Five Years On, p 21
reported of the 335 teams proposed in the NHS Plan by
2004 168 were in place by March 2004
57 CRTs generally work with individuals for a few weeks
whilst AOTs can work with their clients for many
months and even years providing support from the
management of medication to daily living skills and
psychological therapies.
58 Department of Health, (2000) NHS Plan, London, DH
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transformational change in the status of mental health in the NHS and how services are being
delivered to patients.59
In a review of the NSF five years on, Professor Louis Appleby noted the progress made as services
become more responsive to the needs and wishes of the people who use them, and identified the
need for action for the care of long-term mental disorders with a new model of mental health in
primary care.60 This includes new models of in-patient provision to reflect its multiple purposes –
acute care, rehabilitation, crisis admission and specialist treatment and a more flexible division of
responsibilities between primary and secondary care with reduction in emergency admissions
through better continuing care.61 The lawfulness of continuing to detain patients liable to be
detained in hospital for treatment but on leave in the community is of increasing importance given
the policy shift.
Given the current rumours that the Mental Health Bill has stalled yet again62 where does this leave
treatment in the community? Arguably, on the boundary of the hospital. The courts in DR and CS
have not sanctioned compulsory treatment in the community, and arguably have gone as far as a
civilised society should in compelling treatment within a hospital-based regime for the relatively
small number of patients with complex needs living in the community. Compulsory treatment has
been described as “deeply discriminatory.”63 With neither consent nor capacity being particularly
relevant factors, this is unlikely to change. Individuals will continue to be denied autonomy where
treatment for mental disorder is perceived to be in their best interests. The hope is that more
enlightened practice will result in fewer compulsions. The Care Programme Approach has done
much to deliver a comprehensive plan of care for individual patients and improve choice. Better
choice should mean less compulsion. 
The challenge for practitioners will be to ensure that leave is used appropriately as part of a
rehabilitative programme towards discharge and not as a method of enforcing co-operation under
compulsion. Practitioners will need to show that any compulsory treatment plan is facilitating a
process of careful and staged discharge from hospital to community treatment to be lawful and
that the plan is not an alternative to discharge.64
59 Chisholm, A and Ford, R Transforming Mental Health
Care: Assertive Outreach and Crisis Resolution in
Practice, The Sainsbury Centre for Mental
Health/NIMHE 2004; above, DH, NSF for Mental
Health – Five Years On, December 2004 at p66 per
Professor Louis Appleby
60 DH 2004/0457 The National Service Framework for
Mental Health – Five Years On, 20 December 2004.
61 Ibid at p 73
62 For example see Guardian Newspaper 31/10/05
63 Scott-Moncrieff, L. Capacity Choice and Compulsion,
Journal of Mental Health Law, September 2004 at
p146
64 above, R (on the application of CS) v MHRT [2004];
Mental Health Act 1983 Code of Practice revised
1999, Chapter 20.2
